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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate multi-message authenti-
cation to combat adversaries with infinite computational capacity.
An authentication framework over a wiretap channel (W1,W2)
is proposed to achieve information-theoretic security with the
same key. The proposed framework bridges the two research
areas in physical (PHY) layer security: secure transmission
and message authentication. Specifically, the sender Alice first
transmits message M to the receiver Bob over (W1,W2) with an
error correction code; then Alice employs a hash function (i.e.,
ε-AWU2 hash functions) to generate a message tag S of message
M using key K, and encodes S to a codeword Xn by leveraging an
existing strongly secure channel coding with exponentially small
(in code length n) average probability of error; finally, Alice sends
Xn over (W1,W2) to Bob who authenticates the received messages.
We develop a theorem regarding the requirements/conditions for
the authentication framework to be information-theoretic secure
for authenticating a polynomial number of messages in terms of
n. Based on this theorem, we propose an authentication protocol
that can guarantee the security requirements, and prove its
authentication rate can approach infinity when n goes to infinity.
Furthermore, we design and implement an efficient and feasible
authentication protocol over binary symmetric wiretap channel
(BSWC) by using Linear Feedback Shifting Register based (LFSR-
based) hash functions and strong secure polar code. Through
extensive experiments, it is demonstrated that the proposed
protocol can achieve low time cost, high authentication rate, and
low authentication error rate.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Message authentica-
tion, Wiretap channel, Polar codes, LFSR-based hash functions,
strongly secure channel coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication are the funda-
mental requirements for information security. Confidentiality
ensures information is only available to unauthorized enti-
ties, integrity protects information accuracy and completeness
during transmission, while authentication mainly assures the
source of information. To provision those security functions,
the typical approach is through upper-layer cryptographic
algorithms/protocols, which usually provides computational
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security and might be comprised when adversaries have suf-
ficient computation power.
As a complement, there is a flurry of research to provi-
sion information-theoretic security from the physical (PHY)
layer [1]–[6]. Information-theoretic security can ensure the
aforementioned security attributes, even though adversaries
have infinite computational capabilities. Based on the security
objective, PHY-layer security can be roughly divided into
two categories: PHY-layer secure transmission and PHY-layer
message authentication, where the former targets confidential-
ity while the latter focuses on message integrity and sender
authentication. In the literature, the two research areas are
usually separately studied. In addition, there is extensive
research on PHY-layer secure message transmission, aiming
to improve the secrecy rate at which message can be securely
delivered [8]–[16]. In contrast, the research on PHY-layer
message authentication is inadequately studied, and needs
further investigation.
In the line of PHY-layer message authentication, the pi-
oneering work by Simmons [18] proposes an authentication
model over noiseless channels, as shown in Fig. 1. Alice
intends to transmit a message M to Bob, while an adversary
Oscar might launch two different types of man-in-the-middle
attacks: 1) Impersonation attack: forge the sender of the
message; or 2) Substitution attack: modify or replace the
message. It is assumed that Alice and Bob share a common
key K in advance, which helps Bob identify the source of the
message. The message M and the key K have distributions PM
over message space M and PK over key space K , respectively.
Alice maps a pair (M,K) to a codeword W , and sends W over
the noiseless channel. The adversary succeeds if Bob decodes
the adversary’s message and accepts it as a valid message from
Alice. When performing multiple-message authentication, it
is found that this model causes an entropy loss of the secret
key. In fact, after l times of authentication, the probability
for successful attacks is at least 2H(K)/(l+1), which quickly
approaches 1 as l increases [19], where H(·) is the entropy
function.
In this paper, we aim to i) achieve information-theoretic
security for multiple messages authentication with the same
key; and ii) bridge the two separate areas of research in PHY-
layer security. We propose a multi-message authentication
framework over wiretap channel (as shown in Fig. 2), which
integrates existing secure channel coding to achieve a high
authentication rate. Specifically, Alice first encodes M to
Xν using a channel coding method. Then, Alice generates
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Fig. 1. The authentication model over noiseless channels.
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Fig. 2. The authentication model over noise channels.
a message tag S of M using a hash function and employs
a secure channel coding to encode S to Xn. Finally, Alice
transmits (Xν,Xn) over wiretap channel (W1,W2). Suppose that
< Xν,Xn > arrives at Bob as <Y ν,Y n >, where Bob decodes
Y ν to M′ by the channel decoding function and decodes Y n to
S′ by the secure channel code. Bob decides to reject or accept
the authentication by checking the consistency of < M′,S′ >
(i.e., whether S′ is the tag of M′). To achieve information-
theoretical security for a polynomial number of messages and
attacks, we obtain a theorem (i.e., Theorem 1), which states
the requirements/conditions for a authentication protocol to
be information-theoretic secure to authenticate a polynomial
number of messages. Furthermore, based on this theorem, we
propose an authentication protocol with high efficacy. The
authentication rate of the proposed authentication protocol
approaches infinity when n goes to infinity.
Based on theoretical results, we construct a feasible and
efficient authentication protocol over binary symmetric wiretap
channel (BSWC) by using Linear Feedback Shifting Register
based (LFSR-based) hashing functions and strong secure po-
lar codes. Moreover, we evaluate the proposed protocol via
extensive experiments. The results demonstrate that, 1) by de-
creasing the secure rate, the strong secure coding scheme can
provide the reliability of the main channel; and 2) the proposed
authentication scheme has low time cost, high authentication
rate, and low authentication error rate.
The main contributions of this work is summarized as
follows:
• A multiple message authentication framework with the
same secret key K is proposed over wiretap channels. A
theorem on the conditions for the authentication protocols
to be information-theoretical secure is provided, with
rigorous mathematical proof.
• Based on obtained theorem, an authentication protocol
is devised to achieve information-theoretic security with
high efficiency. The authentication rate ρauth = ρtag ·(Cs−
δ) for any fixed tag rate ρtag and any small δ > 0. The
authentication rate can approach infinity with n, where n
is the length of secure channel code Xn.
• We bridge the gap between PHY-layer secure transmis-
sion and PHY-layer message authentication. With the
proposed framework and theorem, a strongly secure chan-
nel coding with exponentially small (in code length n)
average probability of error can induce a multi-message
authentication with information-theoretic security.
• A feasible and efficient authentication protocol over
BSWC is proposed by leveraging the lightweight LFSR-
based hashing functions and secure polar codes. Extensive
experiments validate the feasibility and efficiency of the
proposed protocol.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
related work is reviewed in Section II. Section III introduces
basic concepts and preliminaries that will be used in the
subsequent sections. Section IV presents the system model,
including the authentication model, the adversary model, and
security definitions. In Section V, a multiple-message authen-
tication framework is proposed. In Section VI, the theorem
for authentication protocol to achieve information-theoretical
security is provided In Section VII, we propose a multi-
message authentication protocol and analyze its efficiency.
Section VIII presents a efficient and feasible authentication
protocol over BSWC. In Section IX, we give the simula-
tion studies for authentication over BSWC. The concluding
remarks are provided in Section X.
II. RELATED WORK
A. PHY-Layer Secure Transmission:
The pioneering work on PHY-layer secure transmission in
Wyner [13], demonstrates that information-theoretic security
can be achieved, if the received signal at the attacker is
a degraded version of that at the destination. This result
is generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨ner [14], in which the
attacker’s channel is not necessary to be a degraded version
of the receiver’s channel. Afterwards, secure transmission over
noisy channels are extensively investigated in both theory and
implementations [1]–[5], [8]–[12], [15]–[17]. Particularly, in
[8], a coset coding scheme by using the dual of low-density
parity-check (LDPC) code is proposed to achieve weak secrecy
on a binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC). Extending this
result, a coset coding scheme is proposed by leveraging the
dual of short-cycle-free LDPC code to achieve the strong
secrecy on a BEWC in [9]. In [10], Subramanian et al. propose
a strongly secure channel coding scheme for binary erasure
wiretap channel models (i.e., both the main cannel and the
wiretapper’s channel are binary erasure channels) by using
large-girth LDPC codes. In [11], polar codes is proposed
as methods for approaching the secrecy capacity of general
degraded and symmetric wiretap channels. In [12], Mahdavifar
et al. devise another channel coding algorithm based on polar
codes for binary symmetric wiretap channel models (i.e.,
both the main cannel and the wiretapper’s channel are binary
symmetric channels).
B. PHY-Layer Message Authentication:
PHY-layer message authentication can be traced back to
Simmons’ work in [18], where an authentication model over
noiseless channels is proposed. In [28], the authentication is
3studied considering that the adversary has partial information
regarding the key shared by the sender and receiver. Recently,
authentication over noise channel models drawn increasing
attentions [29]–[34]. The authentication over noise source
model with a (noiseless) public discussion channel was studied
by Korzhik et al. in [29] and Barni in [30]. After that,
the authentication over MIMO fading wiretap channels was
considered by Baracca et al. in [31] and Ferrante et al. in [32].
More recently, Jiang considered the keyless authentication
problem in a noise channel model in [33], [34]. The other
related works also includes [40]–[42]. In [40], a physical
layer authentication mechanism was proposed by using the
multipath effect between the sender and the receiver. In [41],
a wireless physical-layer identification protocol by utilizing the
unique features of the physical waveforms of wireless signals
was presented. To achieve information-theoretic security for
multiple messages authentication, Lai et al. [20] study the
message authentication over noisy channel, as shown in Fig.
2, where the channels from Alice to Bob and from Alice to
Oscar can be regarded as a wiretap channel model (please
refer to Section III-C). However, the authentication efficiency
is bounded by the capacity of the channel from Alice to the
adversary, denoted as I(X ;Z).
Different existing works, this work focuses on multi-
massage authentication over wiretap channels with the same
key. We integrate strongly secure channel coding in the
authentication framework to achieve information-theoretical
security. The conditions for the authentication protocol to be
secure are obtained. With the proposed framework, we bridge
the gap between PHY-layer secure transmission and PHY-
layer message authentication. In this way, any advances of
the area of (computationally efficient) secure channel coding
will result in the improvement of message authentication.
Moreover, we propose an authentication protocol which can
satisfy the security requirements, with the efficiency of ρtag ·
(I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)−δ) which approaches infinity with n.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Notations: Random variables are denoted by upper case
letters (e.g., X ,Y,Z, · · · ), their realizations are denoted by lower
case letters (e.g., x,y,z, · · · ), and the domain of a random
variable is denoted by calligraphic letters (e.g., X ,Y ,Z, · · · ).
Probabilities P(X = x) and P(X = x|Y = y) are denoted by
PX (x) and PX |Y (x|y), or P(x) and P(x|y), respectively. The
following information theory terms can be found in existing
information theory books (e.g. [22], [23]).
• I(X ;Y ) = ∑x,y P(x,y) log
P(x,y)
P(x)P(y) is the mutual informa-
tion between X and Y . H(X) = −∑x P(x) logP(x) and
H(X |Y ) =−∑x,y P(x,y) logP(x|y) is the entropy function
and conditional entropy function, respectively.
• xn denotes a sequence of x1, · · · ,xn.
• The type of a sequence xn ∈ X n is the distribution Pxn on
X defined by Pxn(a) = 1n N(a|xn) for every a ∈ X , where
N(a|xn) is the number of occurrences of a ∈ X in xn.
• For any type P of length n on X , the set of sequences in
X n with type P is called a type class and is denoted by
T nP .
• Distance between random variables X and X ′ over X is
SD(X ;X ′) = ∑x∈X |PX (x)−PX ′(x)|.
• Conditional distance between X and X given Y is defined
as
SD(X |Y ;X) = ∑
y∈Y
P(y)∑
x∈X
|P(x|y)−P(x)|. (1)
• Function negl(n) is negligible in n if for any polynomial
poly(n), limn→∞negl(n)poly(n) = 0.
A. Universal Hash Functions
Any function f : A → B with |A| > |B| is called a hash
function. A universal hash function is a hash function such
that the output frequency occurs almost uniformly [35]–[38].
We now give a definition of the family of almost universal
hash functions as follows.
Definition 1. Let M and S be two finite sets. For ε > 0, a
collection of functions Ψ from M to S is called ε-almost weak
universal (ε-AWU2) if
∀(m,s) ∈M ×S , Pr[ψ : ψ(m) = s]≤ ε; (2)
∀m1,m2(6= m1) ∈M , Pr[ψ : ψ(m1) = ψ(m2)]≤ ε. (3)
The family of hash functions is ε-almost universal (ε-AU2)
if the first condition is replaced by
∀(m,s) ∈M ×S , Pr[ψ : ψ(m) = s] = 1/|S |, (4)
i.e., all hash values are equally likely.
B. Discrete Memoryless Channel
A discrete channel with input alphabet X and output al-
phabet Y is defined as a stochastic matrix W = {W (y|x) :
x ∈ X ,y ∈ Y }, where W (·|x) is the distribution of the channel
output Y given the input X = x, i.e., W (y|x) =PY |X (y|x). In this
case, we usually say X and Y are connected by channel W .
In this paper, we only consider a discrete memoryless channel
(DMC): suppose that the input sequence is xn = x1, · · · ,xn and
the output sequence is yn = y1, · · · ,yn, then PY n|Xn(yn|xn) =
∏ni=1 PYi|Xi(yi|xi) = ∏ni=1 W (yi|xi). For simplicity, we denote
∏ni=1 W (yi|xi) by W (yn|xn).
Suppose Alice wants to send messages to Bob over DMC
W . Let her message domain be S . Then the communication is
described through a pair of mappings (called a coding scheme)
( f ,g), where f : S → X n and g : Y n→ S ∪{⊥}. When Alice
wants to send s ∈ S , he sends f (s) through channel W . When
Bob receives vector yn, he decodes the message as s′ = g(yn),
where ⊥ denotes the detector of an error. Event s 6= s′ is called
a decoding error. The set C = f (S) is called the code book
of this coding scheme; c = f (s) is called a codeword.
C. Basics of Wiretap Channel
Wiretap channel is first introduced by Wyner [13] and
extended by Csiszar and Korner [14]. A wiretap channel is
defined by two DMCs W1 : X → Y and W2 : X → Z, where
X is the input alphabet from the sender Alice, Y is the
output alphabet at the legitimate receiver Bob, and Z is the
output alphabet at the wiretapper Oscar. Alice aims to send
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Fig. 3. The authentication model.
private messages to Bob against Oscar. Denote the domain
of message of Alice by S . To send s ∈ S , Alice sends it
through W1 with a coding scheme ( f ,g). Specifically, she first
sends xn = f (s) into DMCs W1 and W2, from which Bob
receives yn ∈ Y n and Oscar receives zn ∈ Zn. Bob decodes
s′ = g(yn) ∈ S ∪{⊥}. Let Xn,Y n,Zn,S,S′ be random variables
for xn,yn,zn,s,s′ respectively. 1n log |S | is the transmission rate.
The goal of Alice and Bob is to maximize the transmission
rate while keeping Oscar from knowing anything regarding S.
The security is defined as follows.
Definition 2. The sequence of coding schemes {( fn,gn)}n is
called strongly secure channel coding with exponentially small
(in n) average probability of error for the wiretap channel
(W1,W2) (denoted as strongly secure channel coding for
short), if there exists a constant c > 0 such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
Reliability Condition: Pr{S′ 6= S} ≤ exp(−cn) (5)
Strong Security Condition: I(S;Zn)≤ exp(−cn). (6)
For R > 0, if 1n log |S | ≥ R, we called rate R is securely
achievable for (W1,W2). The supremum of securely achievable
rates is called secret capacity of the wiretap channel and is
denoted by Cs.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, the authentication model is first presented,
and the adversary model and the definition of secure authen-
tication protocol are then elaborated.
A. Authentication Model
We consider a wiretap channel W1 : X → Y , W2 : X → Z.
Alice and Bob share a secret K that is uniformly in a set K .
They are connected by channel W1. When Alice sends X ∈ X ,
Bob and Oscar will receive Y ∈ Y and Z ∈ Z, respectively.
Moreover, there is a noiseless channel form Oscar to Bob.
It is clear that the noiseless channel actually gives Oscar an
advantage, since any noisy channel can be simulated with
this noiseless channel by simply randomizing the transmitted
signal. Note that, in wireless communications, the noiseless
channel and noisy channel are the same wireless medium,
where the former employs a Shannon channel code. Let M be
a set of messages. As shown in Fig. 3, when Alice attempts to
send M ∈M to Bob, they perform the following procedure.
• Alice encodes M into X ι with a Shannon channel code for
channel W1, and then transmits it to Bob over channel W1,
and then, encodes (M,K) into Xn ∈ X n as an authentic
with an encoder f and sends it over wiretap channel
(W1,W2).
Alice Bob
Oscar
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Fig. 4. The conceptual authentication model.
• Bob receives Y ν and Y n from channel W1. He then
decodes M′ from Y ν with Shannon channel code and
decodes D ∈ {>,⊥} from M′, Y n and K using a decoder
(or decider) g, where D = > means that Bob accept M′
and D =⊥ means that Bob rejects M′.
Here, when D = >, Alice indeed sends M and M = M′, i.e.,
the decoded message M′ indeed is authenticated from Alice.
Without loss of generality, we can regard the information
transmission with Shannon channel code as the information
transmission over a noiseless channel. Thus, we consider that
there exists a noiseless channel from Alice to Bob which is
full controlled by Oscar. For ease of presentation, we adopt
a conceptual authentication framework in the following, as
shown in Fig. 4, which is equivalent to Fig. 3. Then, the
authentication is performed as follows:
• Alice sends M over a public but unauthenticated noiseless
channel, and then, encodes (M,K) into Xn ∈ X n as an
authentic with an encoder f and sends over wiretap
channel (W1,W2).
• Bob receives M′ from the output of noiseless channel and
Y n from the output of channel W1. He then decodes D ∈
{>,⊥} from M′, Y n and K using a decoder (or decider)
g, where D => means that Bob receives M′ and D =⊥
means that Bob rejects M′.
B. Adversary Model
The communication link between Alice and Oscar is char-
acterized by Channel W2 and the link between Oscar and Bob
is noiseless. Oscar’s attack capability is formalized as follows.
1. He can adaptively request Alice to authenticate any
message M of his choice. As a result, Alice normally
authenticates M to Bob through channel (W1,W2) and
Oscar receives Zn from Channel W2.
2. He can adaptively sends any message M′ ∈M and vector
Y ′n ∈ Y n to Bob. Bob then decodes M′, Y ′n and K into
D ∈ {>,⊥}.
Oscar succeeds (denoted by Succ) if D = > in item (2)
occurs at least once.
C. Security Definition
The security concern consists of completeness and authen-
tication. Completeness essentially assures that when Oscar
does not present, Bob should receive M correctly with a
high probability. Authentication assures that the authentication
failure event Succ occurs negligibly. Formally, we summarize
it as follows.
5Definition 3. A cryptographic protocol Π for a wiretap
channel W1 : X → Y ,W2 : X → Z is a secure authentication
protocol if the following holds:
1. Completeness. When the wiretapper Oscar does
not present, there exists α > 0 such that Pr(D = ⊥) ≤
exp(−nα), where n is the number of use of the wiretap
channel (W1,W2) in the protocol.
2. Authentication. For any wiretapper Oscar, the proba-
bility of success Pr(Succ(Oscar)) is negligible in n.
If we only require authentication to hold against Oscar
that issues at most t authentication queries at item (1) of the
adversary model, then Π is t-secure authentication protocol.
In our previous work [21], we define the efficiency metric
for a secure authentication protocol as follows.
3. Efficiency. The authentication rate is defined as ρauth =
1
n log|M|, which is the ratio of the source message length
to the codeword length.
V. AUTHENTICATION OF MULTIPLE MESSAGE
In this section, we first propose an authentication frame-
work. Then, based on this framework, we conduct the security
analysis to find the conditions/requirements for the authenti-
cation protocol to be secure (in Theorem 2)
A. Authentication Framework
Let {( fn,gn)}n be a secure channel coding for wiretap
channel W1 : X → Y ,W2 : X → Z; S = {1, · · · ,2nRn} be the
source messages for ( fn,gn); and Rn be the code rate of
( fn,gn). Let Ψ = {ψk}k∈K be a collection of hash functions
from M to S . Alice and Bob share a secret key k ∈K . When
Alice intends to send message m←M to Bob, they perform
as follows.
1. Alice computes s = ψk(m) (which is called the message
tag), encodes xn = fn(s), and then sends m and xn
over noiseless channel and channel (W1,W2), respectively.
Suppose that Bob receives m′ and y′n and Oscar receives
m and zn, respectively.
2. Based on m′,y′n, Bob decodes s′ = gn(y′n). If s′ =⊥
or ψk(m′) 6= s′, Bob rejects the message m′; otherwise
accepts m′.
Next, we employ the proposed framework to authenticate a
sequence J of messages M1,M2, · · · ,MJ using the same key
K. In such a scenario, the attacker can choose a time slot
j in which to initiate either an impersonation attack or a
substitution attack.
For an impersonation attack at slot j, Oscar sends a message
to the receiver before the source sends anything. Oscar select
the transmitted message is based on the information collected
through the last j− 1 rounds of authentication. The attacker
is successful if Oscar’s message is accepted as authentic at
Bob. For a substitution attack at slot j, Oscar intercepts the
Alice’s jth packet, modifies it, and sends the modified packet
to the receiver. Oscar can make the modification using the
information gathered in the past transmissions. The attacker is
successful if the modified signal is accepted as authentic and
the message is decoded incorrectly.
For convenience, we denote the random vectors (x1, · · · ,xn)
by ~x . In slot j, if the intended message is m j, Alice transmits
it over the noiseless channel. Then, Alice computes~x j = fn(s j)
and transmits it over the wiretap channel, where k is the key
and message tag s j =ψk(m j). Though Oscar, Bob receives m′j
and ~y′j. Oscar receives m j and ~z j. We denote the probability
of successful impersonation attack at the jth slot by PI, j and
the probability of successful substitution attack at the jth slot
by PS, j.
B. Analysis on Attacks
Impersonation attack: To initiate an impersonation attack
in slot j, Oscar can use the information collected through
m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1. Let h j,im be the strategy (or a func-
tion) employed by the source that maps m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1
to mo j, ~yo, j. We also denote the decoded message tag by
so, j = gn(~yo, j) and the message at the destination after Oscar’s
attack by mo j. For each m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1, Oscar will adapt
a strategy h j,im so that the following probability is maximized:
P(so j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)
= ∑
k∈K
P(k|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1) θ(ψk(mo j),so j),
where
θ(r1,r2) =
{
1, if r1 = r2;
0, otherwise,
for any r1,r2 ∈ R.
After receiving j−1 rounds of transmission, the probability
of successful impersonation attack is
PI, j = ∑
m1,~z1,··· ,m j−1,~z j−1
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)×
sup
h j,im
{
P(so j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)
}
.
(7)
Substitution attack: Oscar can also choose to invoke a
substitution attack after receiving the jth transmission i.e., it
changes the content of the jth package and sends it to the
destination. For a substitution attack, Oscar can adaptively
interleave two types of attacks as follows. In Type I attack,
when Alice sends (m j,~x j), Oscar can revise m to mo j(6= m j);
in Type II attack, Oscar can send any pair mo j(6= m j),~yo j to
Bob noiselessly. Oscar succeeds, if so j = ψk(mo j) in Type
I attacks (where gn(~y j) = so j), or so j = ψk(mo j) in Type II
attacks (where gn(~yo j) = so j).
Type I attack: Oscar knows m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j, and hance
can choose mo j based on this information. Let h1 j,sb be the
strategy employed by the source that maps m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j to
mo j. Then, Oscar transmits mo j over the noiseless channel and
does not modify the authentication information. Hence, mo j
and s j are the message and message tag at the destination after
the attack. The attacker is successful if s j = ψk(mo j), where
s j = g(~y j). Obviously, for each observation m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j,
Oscar should choose h1 j,sb such that
6P(s j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j) (1−θ(mo j,m j))
= ∑
k∈K
P(k|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)×{
θ(ψk(mo j),ψk(m j))(1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
is maximized. Therefore, the probability of successful type I
substitution attack after receiving j rounds of transmission is
PS1, j = ∑
m1,~z1,··· ,m j ,~z j
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)×
sup
h1 j,sb
{
P(s j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j) (1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
.
(8)
Type II attack: Let h2 j,sb be the strategy employed by
the source that maps m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1 to mo j, ~yo, j. After
the opponent’s attack, the decoded message tag is denoted as
so, j = g(~yo, j) and the message at the destination is denoted
as mo j. The attack is successful if so j = ψk(mo j). For each
possible observation m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j, the opponent will adopt
a strategy h2 j,sb so that the following probability is maximized:
P(so j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)(1−θ(mo j,m j))
= ∑
k∈K
P(k|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)×
{
θ(ψk(mo j),so j) (1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
.
Hence, the probability for the jth type II substitution attack
being successful is
PS2, j = ∑
m1,~z1,··· ,m j ,~z j
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)×
sup
h2 j,sb
{
P(so j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j) (1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
.
(9)
Then, the probability of successful substitution attack after
receiving j rounds of transmission is
PS, j = max{PS1, j,PS2, j}.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Based on the proposed framework, we first analyze the
information leakage about the key K and message tag S,
from an information theoretical point of view. The results for
single-/multi-message authentication are given by Proposition
1 and Proposition 2, respectively. Then, based obtained results,
we obtain a theorem (Theorem 1) which states the require-
ments/conditions for the authentication protocol to achieve
information-theoretic security when authenticating a polyno-
mial number of messages.
A. Security Theorem
When a strongly secure channel coding is employed in
the authenticate framework, the attacker obtains no significant
amount of information about secret key K and the message
tag S, in one time authentication, as given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let M, S and Zn be the random variables
defined in the authentication framework (Sec.V.A). Then, with
a strongly secure channel coding, there exists a constant α> 0,
such that
I(S;Zn|M)≤ e−αn, (10)
I(K;Zn|M)≤ e−αn. (11)
Proof: The conditional mutual information can be rewrit-
ten as
I(S;Zn|M) = H(Zn|M)−H(Zn|S,M)
=(a) H(Zn|M)−H(Zn|S) = I(Zn;S)− I(Zn;M)
≤ I(Zn;S)≤(c) e−αn,
I(K;Zn|M) = I(K,M;Zn)− I(M;Zn)
≤(b) I(S;Zn)− I(M;Zn)
≤ I(S;Zn)≤(c) e−αn,
where (a) and (b) are based on the fact that M→MK→ S→ Zn
forms a Markov chain, while (c) comes from Definition 2.
Next, we analyze the security for multiple-message authen-
tication.
Proposition 2. When the same key K is used to authenticate
a sequence j of messages M1, · · · ,M j, if a strongly secure
channel coding and a ε-AU2 hash function are employed, then
there exists a constant α> 0, such that for any b = 1, · · · , j
I(Sb;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|M1, · · · ,M j) ≤ e−αn (12)
I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|M1, · · · ,M j) ≤ j · e−αn (13)
where S j = ψK(M j).
Proof: From inequality (10), there exists a constant
α > 0 such that I(S j;~Z j|M j) ≤ e−αn. Given (M1, · · · ,M j) =
(m1, · · · ,m j), for any b ∈ {1, · · · , j}, we have
~Zb→ Sb→ K→ (S1 · · · ,Sb−1)→ (~Z1, · · · ,~Zb−1) (14)
~Zb→ Sb→ K→ (Sb+1, · · · ,S j)→ (~Zb+1, · · · ,~Z j) (15)
form two Markov chains. Hence, given m1, · · · ,m j, ~Zb →
Sb→~Z1, · · · ,~Zb−1,~Zb+1, · · · ,~Z j forms a Markov chain. Conse-
quently, from data processing inequality, the following holds
I(Sb;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|m1, · · · ,m j)≤ I(Sb,~Zb|m1, · · · ,m j). (16)
Averaging over m1, · · · ,mb, we have
I(Sb;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|M1, · · · ,M j) (17)
≤ I(Sb,~Zb|M1, · · · ,M j) (18)
= I(Sb,~Zb|Mb)≤ e−αn (19)
Given (M1, · · · ,M j) = (m1, · · · ,m j), we have ~Zb →
K → (~Z1, · · · ,~Zb−1) forms a Markov chain for any
b ≤ j. Hence, by data processing inequality, we have
I(K;~Zb|~Z1, · · · ,~Zb−1,m1, · · · ,m j) ≤ I(K;~Zb|m1, · · · ,m j). Aver-
aging over m1, · · · ,mb, we have
I(K;~Zb|~Z1, · · · ,~Zb−1,M1, · · · ,M j)≤ I(K;~Zb|M1, · · · ,M j).
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I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|M1, · · · ,M j)
≤
j
∑
b=1
I(K;~Zb|~Z1, · · · ,~Zb−1,M1, · · · ,M j)
≤
j
∑
b=1
I(K;~Zb|M1, · · · ,M j)
=
j
∑
b=1
I(K;~Zb|Mb)≤ j · e−αn.
Based on the above results, we have the following theorem
regarding the requirements/conditions for a multi-message
authentication protocol to be information-theoretical security.
Theorem 1. Suppose that {( fn,gn)}n is a strongly secure
channel coding for wiretap channel (W1,W2), and Ψ : M ×
K → S is an ε- AWU2 hash function with ε being negligible
in n. Then, for any polynomial t(·) and sufficiently large n,
the proposed protocol Π is t(n)-secure.
From this theorem, we only have to construct a family of
hashing function and strongly secure channel code satisfying
the conditions above to achieve security of the proposed
protocol. We will discuss how to design such kind of class of
hash functions and channel code to meet these requirements
in Sec. VIII. The detailed proof will be provided in the next
subsection.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
In what follows, we prove Theorem 1. The main idea is to
prove that sender Alice can authenticate a polynomial number
of messages using K, where the attacker Oscar can adaptively
interleave polynomial number of the impersonation attacks or
substitution attacks.
We now present some lemmas that will be used to prove
Theorem 1. The following lemma is from [24, Lemma 1],
where X has the form f (X) for a function f in [24]. Since f
is arbitrary except | f (X )| ≥ 4, the two lemmas are equivalent.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be two random variables over X and
Y , respectively, where |X | ≥ 4. Then
1
2ln2
SD(X |Y ;X)2 ≤ I(X ;Y )≤ SD(X |Y ;X) log |X |
SD(X |Y ;X) .
(20)
Lemma 2. If the same key K is used to authenticate a
sequence J of messages M1,M2, · · · ,M j by using the proposed
framework j times. Let
Ω j = {m1, · · · ,m j : I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|m1, · · · ,m j)> ( j · e−αn)1/2}.
Then, we have
P(Ω j)≤ ( j · e−αn)1/2 , (21)
Moreover, for all (m1, · · · ,m j) ∈Ωcj,
I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|m1, · · · ,m j)≤ ( j · e−αn)1/2. (22)
Proof: By the definition of the conditional mutual infor-
mation, we have
( jτ)1/2∑
Ω j
P(m1, · · · ,m j)
≤∑
Ω j
P(m1, · · · ,m j)I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|m1, · · · ,m j)
≤I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|M1, · · · ,M j))≤ j · e−αn.
Therefore,
P(Ω j) =∑
Ω j
P(m1, · · · ,m j) =≤ ( j · e−αn)1/2 .
It holds that I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|m1, · · · ,m j) ≤ ( j · e−αn)1/2 for all
(m1, · · · ,m j) ∈Ωcj.
For all (m1, · · · ,m j) ∈ Ωcj, we define probability
P˜(k,~z1, · · · ,~z j) on K ×~Z j by
P˜(k,~z1, · · · ,~z j) = Pr(k,~z1, · · · ,~z j|m1, · · · ,m j). (23)
Denote Pˆ(k) and Qˆ(~z1, · · · ,~z j) as the marginal distribution of
P˜, respectively.
By Lemma 1, Proposition 2 and the definition of Ωcj, we
can obtain that, for all (m1, · · · ,m j) ∈Ωcj,
SD(K|~Z1, · · · ,~Z j,m1, · · · ,m j;K|m1, · · · ,m j)
≤
√
2ln2I(K;~Z1, · · · ,~Z j|m1, · · · ,m j)
≤
√
2ln2( j · e−αn)1/4,
(24)
where the conditional probability distance is denoted by
SD(K|~Z1, · · · ,~Z j,m1, · · · ,m j;K|m1, · · · ,m j)
= ∑
~z1,··· ,~z j
Qˆ(~z1, · · · ,~z j)SD(K|~z1, · · · ,~z j,m1, · · · ,m j;K|m1, · · · ,m j).
(25)
Lemma 3. For all (m1, · · · ,m j) ∈Ωcj, we define
O j = {~z1, · · · ,~z j : d(~z1, · · · ,~z j)> ( j · e−αn)1/8}, (26)
where
d(~z1, · · · ,~z j) = SD(K|~z1, · · · ,~z j,m1, · · · ,m j;K|m1, · · · ,m j).
(27)
Then,
Qˆ(O j)≤
√
2ln2( j · e−αn)1/8. (28)
Proof: From Equation 24, 25 and 26, we have
( j · e−αn)1/4∑
O j
Qˆ(~z1, · · · ,~z j)
≤∑
O j
Qˆ(~z1, · · · ,~z j)d(~z1, · · · ,~z j)
≤SD(K|~Z1, · · · ,~Z j,m1, · · · ,m j;K|m1, · · · ,m j)
≤
√
2ln2( j · e−αn)1/4
and thus
Qˆ(O j) =∑
O j
Qˆ(~z1, · · · ,~z j)≤
√
2ln2( j · e−αn)1/8.
8Based on the discussion above, we now present the details
of proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: From Lemma 4, the completeness requirement can
be satisfied. Next, we will concentrate on the authentication
property.
The Upper bound of PI, j: We bound the success probability
of impersonation attack at slot j.
For j≥ 2, (m1, · · · ,m j−1) ∈Ωcj−1 and (~z1, · · · ,~z j−1)∈Ocj−1,
we have
P(ro j = ψK(mo j)|~z1,m1, · · · ,~z j−1,m j−1)
=∑
k
P(k|~z1,m1, · · · ,~z j−1,m j−1) θ(ψk(mo j),ro j)
≤∑
k
{
|P(k|~z1,m1, · · · ,~z j−1,m j−1)−P(k|m1, · · · ,m j−1)|
+P(k|m1, · · · ,m j−1)
}
θ(ψk(mo j),ro j)
≤ d(~z1, · · · ,~z j−1)+∑
k
P(k|m1, · · · ,m j−1) θ(ψk(mo j),ro j)
≤ d(~z1, · · · ,~z j−1)+∑
k
P(k) θ(ψk(mo j),ro j)
(K and M1, ...,M j are independent)
= ( j · e−αn)1/8+ 1|K | (|K |ε) (by the definition of ε-AWU2)
= ( j · e−αn)1/8+ ε
Then, by Equation (7), the success probability of imperson-
ation attack can be given as
PI, j = ∑
m1,~z1,··· ,m j−1,~z j−1
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)×
sup
h j,im
{
P(so j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)
}
=
{
∑
{Ωcj−1×Ocj−1}c
+ ∑
Ωcj−1×Ocj−1
}
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)×
sup
h j,im
{
P(so j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)
}
≤ 3( j · e−αn)1/8+ ∑
Ωcj−1×Ocj−1
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j−1,~z j−1)×{
( j · e−αn)1/8+ ε
}
≤ ε+4( j · e−αn)1/8.
The Upper bound of PS, j: We first bound the success
probability PS1, j of type I substitution attack in slot j.
For j≥ 2, (m1, · · · ,m j) ∈Ωcj and (~z1, · · · ,~z j)∈Ocj , we have
P(s j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j) (1−θ(mo j,m j))
= ∑
k∈K
P(k|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)×{
θ(ψk(mo j),ψk(m j))(1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
≤d(~z1, · · · ,~z j)+∑
k
P(k|m1, · · · ,m j−1)×{
θ(ψk(mo j),ψk(m j))(1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
≤d(~z1, · · · ,~z j)+∑
k
P(k)θ(ψk(mo j),r j)(1−θ(mo j,m j))
(K and M1, ...,M j are independent)
=( j · e−αn)1/8+ 1|K | · ε|K | (by the definition of ε-AWU2)
=( j · e−αn)1/8+ ε
From Equation (8), PS1, j can be rewritten as
PS1, j = ∑
m1,~z1,··· ,m j ,~z j
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)×
sup
h1 j,sb
{
P(s j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j) (1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
=
{
∑
{Ωcj×Ocj}c
+ ∑
Ωcj×Ocj
}
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)×
sup
h j,im
{
P(s j = ψK(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j) (1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
≤ 3( j · e−αn)1/8+ ∑
Ωcj×Ocj
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)[( j · e−αn)1/8+ ε]
≤ ε+4( j · e−αn)1/8.
Then, we bound the success probability PS2, j of type II
substitution attack in slot j. Similarly, we have
P(ro j = ψk(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)(1−θ(mo j,m j))
≤ε+( j · e−αn)1/8
From Equation (9) and following the same procedure in the
proof of the upper bound of PS1, j, we have
PS2, j = ∑
m1,~z1,··· ,m j ,~z j
P(m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)
sup
h2 j,sb
{
P(so j = ψk(mo j)|m1,~z1, · · · ,m j,~z j)(1−θ(mo j,m j))
}
≤ε+4( j · e−αn)1/8.
Thus, the success probability of Oscar after attacking t(n)
times from Oscar (and authenticating t(n) messages with the
same key) can be rewritten as
PD ≤
t(n)
∑
j=1
max{PI, j,PS1, j,PS2, j}
≤
t(n)
∑
j=1
ε+4( j · e−αn)1/8 (by ε≥ 1
S
)
≤ t(n) · ε+4 · t2(n) · e− 18αn
9This is negligible as t(n) is a polynomial and ε is negligible.
VII. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL AND EFFICIENCY
In this section, we first prove the existence of the authentica-
tion protocol that can meet the security requirements. Then, we
propose an authentication protocol and analyze the efficiency.
A. Existence
The following result states that there exists a ε-AWU2 class
of hash functions with ε being negligible in n.
Theorem 2. [37] Let q be a prime power and let i≥ 1 be an
integer. Then, there exists hence (i+ 1)/q-AU2 class of qi+2
hash functions from M to S , where |M |= q2i and |S |= q.
A set with size v can be enumerated with logv bits. It is clear
that a family of ε-AU2 hash functions is ε-AWU2. Therefore,
the above theorem implies that there exists a family of (i+
1)/q-AWU2 hash function indexed by (i+2) logq bits which
can compress a message with length 2i logq to a tag with
length logq. In practice, ε = (i+ 2)/q and index length (i+
2) logq should be small and the message length 2i logq should
be large. If i= 8 and q= 250, then the index length is 62 bytes,
ε≈ 2−47, the message length is 1.5M bytes with the tag of 50
bits.
In [24], Csiszar showed the following lemma by using
random coding.
Lemma 4. [24] Let P be a type of length n over X with
P(x)> 0 for all x and X is distributed according to P. Consider
a wiretap channel W1 : X → Y , W2 : X → Z with I(X ;Y ) >
I(X ;Z)+2τ for some τ> 0. Then, there exists a set Cn ⊆ T nP
with size 2n(I(X ;Y )−τ) and an equipartition φ : Cn→ {1, · · · , ι}
for Cn with ι≤ 2n(I(X ;Y )−I(X ;Z)−2τ) such that Cn is the code for
channel W1 with exponentially small (in n) average probability
of error and I(φ(X˜n);Zn) is exponentially small (in n), where
X˜n is uniformly random over Cn.
This lemma implies that a strongly secure channel coding
can achieve secrecy rate of 1n log ι, for any n. Specifically,
suppose that ( fn,gn) be the coding scheme for W1, where fn
and gn are the encoding and decoding methods, respectively.
For s ∈ S = {1, · · · , ι}, fn(s) for the wiretap channel is to take
x˜n ← φ−1(s), and decoding gn(yn) := φ[x¯n], for x¯n = gn(yn).,
where yn is the receive message.
Let ι = 2u ≤ 2n(I(X ;Y )−I(X ;Z)−2τ). Taking q = 2u and i =
ploy(u) for some polynomial function ploy(·) (in Theorem
2), we can conclude that the family of hash functions in this
theorem satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1. Based upon the
discussion above, we have the theorem as follows.
Theorem 3. Let I(X ;Y )> I(X ;Z)+τ for some constant τ> 0,
where Y , Z are the outputs of wiretap channel (W1,W2) with
input X; and PX is a type P with P(x) > 0. Then, for any
polynomial t(·) and sufficiently large n, there exists a t(n)-
secure authentication protocol Π.
Proof: It can be directly obtained from Theorem 1,
Theorem 2, and Lemma 4.
In [13], the concepts of partial ordering of DMC with
common input alphabet were introduced. The single-letter
characterization of the relation channel W1 is more capable
than channel W2 if I(X ;Y ) ≥ I(X ;Z) for every input X . The
relation channel W1 is less noisy than channel W2 was single-
letter characterized by the property that for every Markov
chain U → X →Y,Z, we have I(U ;Y )≥ I(U ;Z). The relation
channel W2 is no less noisy than channel W1 was characterized
by the property that there exists a Markov chain U→X→Y,Z
such that I(U ;Y ) > I(U ;Z). The following theorem show
that the condition I(X ;Y ) > I(X ;Z)+ τ in Theorem 3 can be
loosened to the condition that W2 is no less noisy than W1.
Corollary 1. If W2 is no less noise than W1. Then, for any
polynomial t(·) and sufficiently large n, there exists a t(n)-
secure authentication protocol Π for wiretap channel (W1,W2).
Proof: It is directly obtained from Theorem 3 and the
definition that W2 is no less noisy than W1.
B. High-Efficiency Authentication Protocol
Note that, in Lemma 4, ι can be any number no more
than 2n(I(X ;Y )−I(X ;Z)−2τ) and τ is any positive number. By [14,
Theorem 3], if W1 is more capable than W2, then
Cs = max
PX
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z).
Thus, from Lemma 4 and [14, Theorem 3], we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. There exists a sequence of types {Pn}n over X
such that code rate Rn for coding scheme ( fn,gn) satisfies
limn→∞Rn =Cs.
In order to obtain a authentication protocol, which sat-
isfy the security requirements and is efficient, we use the
strongly secure channel coding induced by Lemma 4. Next,
we only need to specify τ, Ψ, M , K , R and ε. For our
construction, the constraint for S is logSn < I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)+
τ (by Lemma 4), where τ only has the constraint I(X ;Y ) >
I(X ;Z) + τ (by Lemma 4). So for any δ ∈ (0, I(X ;Y ) −
I(X ;Z)), we can define τ = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)− δ/2 and then
set |S |= 2n(I(X ;Y )−I(X ;Z)−δ). Then, we have
ρchan =
log |S |
n
= I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)−δ (29)
for any δ ∈ (0, I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)).
Let τ = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)− δ/2. Then, ρauth = [I(X ;Y )−
I(X ;Z)−δ] ·ρtag. Further, we realize ε-AWU2 Ψ with λ(n)+1q -
AU2 in Theorem 2, where |S |= q= 2n(I(X ;Y )−I(X ;Z)−δ), |K |=
qλ(n)+2, |M |= q2λ(n) , ε= λ(n)+1q . It is easy to verify that under
this setup, the security condition in our authentication theorem
is satisfied as long as λ(n)≤ 2ωn for some ω ∈ (0,ρchan). As
a result, ρtag = 2λ(n) and ρauth = [I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)− δ]2λ(n),
where λ(n) ≤ 2ωn for some ω ∈ (0,ρchan). The details of the
message authentication protocol are shown in Protocol 1.
C. Efficiency
The authentication rate ρauth can be rewritten as ρauth =
ρtag ·ρchan, where ρtag = log |M |log |S | and ρchan = log |S |n . We name
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Preliminaries:
• Let 4I = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z), δ ∈ (0,4I), τ=4I−δ/2,
ω ∈ (0,4I−δ), and q = 2n(4I−δ).
• Let ( fn,gn) be the secrecy capacity achievable strong secrecy
coding (in Lemma 3), where n is the code length.
• Let Ψ= {ψk}k∈K be a collection of ε-AWU2 hash functions
from M to S , in which, |M |= q2λ(n) , |S |= q, |K |= qλ(n)+2,
ε= λ(n)+1q , and λ(n)≤ 2ωn.
• Let k ∈K be the secret key shared by Alice and Bob.
Protocol:
If Alice intends to send and authenticate message m ∈M to
Bob, then they perform the following protocol.
1. Alice first computes the message tag s = ψk(m), and encodes
xn = fn(s) with the strongly secure channel coding. And then,
Alice transmits m and xn over noiseless channel and wiretap
channel (W1,W2), respectively.
2. Based on the received information m′ and y′n from noiseless
channel and wiretap channel (W1,W2), respectively, Bob first
decodes s′ = gn(y′n). Then Bob verifies if m′ is sent from
Alice as follows. If s′ =⊥ or ψk(m′) 6= s′, Bob rejects the
message m′; otherwise accepts m′.
ρtag the tag rate and ρchan the channel coding rate, respec-
tively. Combining with Lemma 5, we can have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. If W1 is more capable than W2, for any δ∈ (0,Cs),
taking τ =Cs−δ/2, the proposed protocol is t(n)-secure (or
polynomial secure) with
ρauth = (Cs−δ) ·2λ(n), (30)
where λ(n) ≤ 2ωn for some ω ∈ (0,ρchan), and Cs =
maxPX I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Z). Furthermore, if limn→∞λ(n) = ∞,
then
lim
n→∞ρauth = ∞. (31)
From Theorem 4, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. If W2 is no less noisy than W1, for any polynomial
t(·) and a sufficiently large n, there exists a t(n)-secure
authentication protocol Π with
ρauth = (Cs−δ) ·2λ(n), (32)
for wiretap channel (W1,W2), where Cs is the secrecy capacity
of (W1,W2) denoted as Cs = maxU→X→Y Z I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z).
Proof: By Corollary 2 in [14], we have Cs =
maxU→X→Y Z I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z). Thus, there exists a RV U such
that U → X → Y Z, and I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) >Cs− δ/4 for any
δ ∈ (0,Cs). By using U to replace X in Theorem 4 and taking
τ=Cs−δ/4, it can be proved, based on Theorem 4.
Note that, in [20], a capacity achieving codebook is divided
into |K | subsets, each of which is further partitioned into |M |
bins, such that the information of the key K can be hidden
from the attacker. Thus, the authentication rate of this protocol
can be given as 1n |M | = I(X ;Z)− ξ for a certain ξ > 0. The
authentication rate of the proposed protocol can reach infinity
when n goes to infinity by employing the security channel
code and ε-AU2 hash functions.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION: AUTHENTICATION OVER BSWC
In this section, we consider message authentication problem
over a binary symmetric wiretap channel (BSWC), where the
main channel and the wiretapper’s channel are the binary
symmetric channel with crossover probability p and q, re-
spectively, denoted by BSC(p) and BSC(q). From Theorem
1, we only need to design a ε-AWU2 hash functions and a
strong secure channel coding, which meet the requirements in
this theorem, so as to achieve information-theoretic security.
To this end, we study how to meet these requirements by
leveraging LFSR-based hash functions and strong secure polar
code.
A. ε-AWU2 Hash Functions
Let the message space M and tag space S be the set of
binary strings of length t and u, respectively. We consider a
specific hash functions as follows. A family of hash functions
Ψ :M → S is ⊕-linear if and only if
ψk(m⊕m′) = ψk(m)⊕ψk(m′) (33)
for any m,m′ ∈M .
For any m,m′ ∈M , we have Pr[ψ : ψ(m) = ψ(m′)] = Pr[ψ :
ψ(m)⊕ψ(m′) = 0] = Pr[ψ : ψ(m⊕m′) = 0]. It further equals
to Pr[ψ :ψ(m) = 0] for any m∈M , where 0 is the zero string.
Thus, a family of ⊕-linear hash functions is ε-AWU2 if and
only if
∀(m,s) ∈M ×S , Pr[ψ : ψ(m) = s]≤ ε. (34)
The family of ⊕-linear hash functions satisfying Equation (34)
is called ε-balanced according to Krawczuk’s work in [39].
Carter and Wegman [35] give a strong universal2 family of
hash functions {
ψA,b : ψA,b(m) = m ·A+b
}
A,b (35)
where A is an t×u Boolean matrix, m(6= 0) is a message with
length t, and b is a binary vector with length u. However,
the key length is u(t + 1), which is too expensive for key
distribution and storage.
To solve such a problem, Krawczuk in [39] constructs a
family of ε-AWU2 hash functions by slightly modifying Carter
and Wegman’s method. Specifically, Krawczuk provides an
efficient construction of matrix A with a Linear Feedback
Shifting Register (LFSR) to shorten the key length as fol-
lows. Let p(x) be an irreducible polynomial over GF(2), and
(a0,a1, · · · ,au−1) be the initial state of a LFSR corresponding
to the coefficients of p(x). If a0,a1, · · · is the bit sequence
generated by the LFSR, the matrix A can be expressed as
A =

a0 a1 · · · au−1
a1 a2 · · · au
...
...
. . .
...
at−1 at · · · au+t−2
 (36)
Krawczuk [39] shows that the LFSR-based construction
defined above is ε-balanced (i.e., ε-AWU2) for ε ≤ t2u−1 , and
its key length is reduced from t(u+ 1) to 3u (i.e., u bits for
b, u bits for the generator polynomial p(x), and u bits for the
initial state of the LFSR).
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Fig. 5. The encoding process of polar codes.
B. Strong Secure Polar Codes
Polar code is introduced by Arikan in [7], which can achieve
the capacity of any binary-input symmetric DMCs with low
encoding and decoding complexity. Let
G =
(
1 0
1 1
)
, (37)
and G⊗r be the m-th Kronecker power of G. For any V n ∈
{0,1}n, V n is encoded as Xn =V nPnG⊗r, where n= 2r and Pn
is the bit-reversal permutation matrix with size n×n. As shown
in Fig. 5, Xn is sent over a binary-input channel symmetric
DMC W n times independently.
By defining
W˜ (yn|vn) =W n(yn|vnPnG⊗r), (38)
for any i ≤ n, Arikan in [7] defines a channel Wi : {0,1} →
Y n×{0,1}i−1 as
Wi(yn,vi−1|vi) = 12n−1 ∑e∈{0,1}n−i
W˜ (yn|vi,e). (39)
Arikan shows that as r grows, it leads to channel polarization,
i.e., for any i, Wi approaches either a noiseless channel (i.e.,
good channel) or a pure-noise channel (i.e., bad channel).
Denoting Bhattacharyya parameter of channel W as
Z(W ) = ∑
y∈Y
√
W (y|0)W (y|1), (40)
the index sets of the good channels and bad channel can be
defined as follows:
Gn(W,β) =
{
i ∈ [n] : Z(Wi)< 2−nβ/n
}
(41)
Bn(W,β) =
{
i ∈ [n] : Z(Wi)≥ 2−nβ/n
}
(42)
where β< 1/2 is a fixed constant, and [n] = {1,2, · · · ,n}.
Based on Arikan’s work, a strong-security coding scheme
with polar codes is proposed by Mahdavifar and Vardy in [12].
Let C(Wi) be the capacity of channel Wi. Define the index set
of σn-poor bit-channel as
Pn(W,σn) = {i ∈ [n] : C(Wi)≤ σn} (43)
for some positive constant σn.
Suppose that the main channel is W ∗ = BSC(p), and the
wiretapper’s channel is W = BSC(q). Define index sets A, B,
X, and Y as follows:
A = Pn(W,σn)∩Gn(W ∗,β) (44)
B = Pn(W,σn)∩Bn(W ∗,β) (45)
X = {[n]\Pn(W,σn)}∩Bn(W ∗,β) (46)
Y = {[n]\Pn(W,σn)}∩Gn(W ∗,β) (47)
Y
random 
bits
A
information 
bits
X
random 
bits
B
zeros
good for Bob
ऑ࢔ሺࢃכǡ ࢼሻ
bad for Bob
ऌ࢔ሺࢃכǡ ࢼሻ
Not ࣌࢔Ǧ࢖࢕࢕࢘ for Eve  
ܖ Ȁच࢔ሺࢃǡ ࣌࢔ሻ
࣌࢔Ǧ࢖࢕࢕࢘ for Eve  
च࢔ሺࢃǡ ࣌࢔ሻ
Fig. 6. Mahdavifar and Vardy’s strongly secure channel coding scheme.
The strongly secure channel coding scheme proposed Mah-
davifar and Vardy is shown in Fig. 6, in which the channels
in A are used to transmit information bits; the channels in B
are used to send zeros; and channels in X and Y are used
to transmit random bits. Mahdavifar and Vardy show that the
their coding scheme is secrecy capacity achievable with strong
security in [12]. The proposed encoding and decoding process
is described as follows.
• Encoding: Let u be the information bits in {0,1}|A|.
Alice selects e for {0,1}|Y| uniformly at random. Taking
vn(A) = u, vn(X∪Y) = e and vn(B) = 0, the codeword
of vn can be expressed as
xn = vnPnG⊗r, (48)
where vn(D) = (vi1 ,vi2 · · · ,vi|A|) for any index set D =
{i1,vi2 , · · · , i|D|}.
• Decoding: After receiving yn from the main channel
W ∗, Bob produces a vector vˆn by invoking successive
cancellation decoding in [7] for polar code Cn(A∪Y).
Without loss of generality, we assume that Eve knows the
information sets and frozen sets. This can be done by calcu-
lating Bhattacharyya parameters if the crossover probability of
the main channel is known to Eve. Clearly, this assumption is
reasonable and even strengthens Eve’s capability.
In our polar code construction, we take
σn = 2n
−γ
(49)
to obtain σn-poor bit channels (i.e., Equation (43)) for wire-
tapper’s channel. From [12, Theorem 17], this coding scheme
is strong security.
As mentioned in [12], it cannot provide the reliability of the
main channel when the coding scheme attempts to achieve
the secrecy capacity. However, it is unnecessary to achieve
the secrecy capacity when the coding scheme is used in the
proposed authentication protocol, as the authentication rate is
main determined by the rate of the hash functions. In fact, we
will show that the reliability of the main channel is achievable
if the secrecy rate is lower than the secrecy capacity in the
following section.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate
the performance of the message authentication protocol over
BSWC. In the simulations, we use LFSR-based ε-AWU2 Hash
Functions and strong secure polar codes in the proposed
authentication framework.
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A. Performance of Secure Polar Codes
Since secure polar codes play a key role in the proposed au-
thentication protocol. It is necessary to evaluate the reliability
and security of the channel coding scheme.
Taking β = 0.1, γ = 0.1, and the main channel’s crossover
probability p = 0.1, an experiment is designed to test the de-
coding error with respect to different code lengthes as follows.
Alice encodes a randomly chosen message with coding scheme
in Section VIII-B, and then, transmits the codeword over
wiretap channel (BSC(p), BSC(q)); after receiving the output
of their respective channels, Bob and Eve invoke successive
cancellation decoding algorithm in [7]. Here, we repeat the
experiment 100 times for each set of parameters.
From the simulations above, we find that all the decoding
error rates at Bob is zero, i.e., the polar codes constructed by
in Section VIII-B with the parameters setting above can be
correctly decoded by the main user. Note that, the reliability
of the coding scheme mainly depends on the the size of index
set X. Fig. 7 shows the cardinality of X with respect to the
code length n. It can be seen that the number of X for each
n under different wiretap channel scenarios are small. As a
result, the reliability of the coding scheme is achievable.
Fig. 8 compares the secrecy capability of the corresponding
wiretap channel and the secrecy rate of the polar codes
under different code lengthes. It can be seen that 1) a larger
code length improves the secrecy rate; and 2) there is a
substantial gap between secrecy rate and secrecy capacity.
The results imply that, 1) a larger code length can lead to
a higher authentication rate when polar codes is used in the
proposed authentication protocol; and 2) there is substantial
gap between the code rate and channel capacity, which leads
to the reliability of the coding scheme, as a lower code rate
results in a higher reliability.
Fig. 9 shows the decoding error rate at Eve versus the code
length under different set of parameters and wiretap channel
scenarios. It can be seen that the error rate is closer to 0.5
when the code length n decreases. It is worth noting that,
a smaller absolute value of the difference between the error
rate and 0.5 means a higher entropy of the secure information
at Eve, which further indicates a higher security of the secure
information. As shown in this figure, the bar of decoding error
rate does not exist for q= 0.2 and n= 512 (or n= 1024). The
reason is that, A= /0 in these cases, which means Alice cannot
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transmit any secure information to Bob.
Fig. 10 shows the number of information bits and random
bits versus the code length under different wiretap channel
scenarios. We can find that both the number of information bits
and random bits increase with the increasing of code length.
Therefore, for any length |S| of the message tag, there exists
a code length n0, such that |S| ≤ |A(n)| for any n> n0, where
A(n) is the index set of information bits in terms of code
length n.
B. Exploration of Protocol Parameters
We now consider the effect of the channel partition parame-
ters β and γ on the proposed protocol. Fig.11 and Fig. 12 show
the change of the number of information bits and the decoding
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error rate at Eve, respectively, versus varying parameters β and
γ, where n = 8192, p = 0.1, and q = 0.3.
As shown in Fig. 11, the blue line corresponds to the number
of information bits by changing the value of β and fixing γ=
0.1, while the red line describes the number of information
bits by fixing β = 0.1 and varying the value of γ. The result
shows that the number of the information bit decreases with
increasing the β and γ. The reason is that the cardinality of
Pn(W,σn) and Gn(W ∗,β) decrease with increasing β and γ,
respectively. From this result, a smaller value of β and γ means
a longer length of authentication tag, and further implies a
higher authentication rate.
As shown in Fig. 12, the blue line corresponds to the the
decoding error rate at Eve by changing the value of β and
fixing γ= 0.1, while the red line describes then decoding error
rate at Eve by fixing β= 0.1 and varying the value of γ. It can
be seen that, the error rate is less than 0.48 for β,γ∈ (0,0.05);
and the error rate is in [0.495,0.505] for β,γ ∈ [0.05,0.2]. The
reason is that, if β and γ are too small, the size of the set that
is both good for Bob and poor for Eve will be large. As a
result, the probability of the event that, the indexes which are
“not so bad” for Eve are in A, will increase.
Based on the discussion above, for both efficiency and
security of the proposed protocol, we can choose β and γ in
the interval [0.05,0.2].
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C. Performance of the Proposed Protocol
We conduct simulations in a large variety of paraments
under different crossover probabilities in both main channel
and wiretap channel. We use the metrics for performance
evaluation as follows: time cost, authentication error rate, and
authentication rate.
Let the message length be 2η bits, and the tag length be η′
bits, The family of hash functions is{
Ψk : {0,1}2η →{0,1}η′
}
k
, (50)
where k = (p(x),e,b), and e is the initial state of the LFSR
with primitive generator polynomial p(x). So, the key length
is 3η′ bits and ε≤ 2η−η′+1.
In the authentication protocol, we require that the index set
number is larger than the tag length, i.e., |A| ≥ η′. If |A|> η′,
Alice transmits message tag s with the first η′ channels in A,
and sends random bits with the remaining channels in A.
We first consider the time cost of the proposed protocol.
The time cost at Alice includes the tag generation time and
the encoding time, while the time cost at Bob involves the
tag generation time and the decoding time. Fig. 13 and Fig.
14 show the time cost at Alice and Bob, respectively, with
respect to the code length with different message lengths. Here
β = 0.1, γ = 0.1, q = 0.1, p = 0.3, the message length is 2η,
and the primitive generator polynomial used to generate the
LFSR is:
p(x) = x101+ x84+ x66+ x49+ x32+ x16+1. (51)
The results show that 1) a larger message length and code
length improve the time cost; and 2) the impact of the code
length on time cost is more sensitive than that of the message
length on time cost. The latter result further reveals that
the encoding/decoding time is far larger than the hashing
time. Fortunately, the time cost of the proposed protocol will
dramatically decrease when this protocol is implemented in
hardware, as the encoding/decoding process of polar code and
LFSR can be implemented in hardware with a low time cost.
Then, we evaluate the authentication error rate and authenti-
cation rate of the proposed protocol under different scenarios.
In this simulation, we set β= 0.1, γ= 0.1 and n = 8192, and
take the primitive generator polynomial to generate the LFSR
14
512 1024 2048 4096 8192 163840
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
The length of the codeword of the polar codes, n
Th
e t
im
e c
os
t a
t B
ob
η=10
η=11
η=12
η=13
η=14
η=15
Fig. 14. Time cost at Bob.
TABLE I
SIMULATION SCENARIOS
Index p q L(M) L(K) L(S)
A 0.1 0.2 225 303 bits 101 bits
B 0.1 0.3 225 303 bits 101 bits
C 0.1 0.4 225 303 bits 101 bits
D 0.2 0.3 220 192 bits 64 bits
E 0.2 0.4 220 192 bits 64 bits
F 0.3 0.4 220 192 bits 64 bits
A B C D E F10
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Fig. 15. Authentication rate under different scenarios.
as Equation (51) and
p(x) = x64+ x9+ x8+ x7+ x6+ x3+1 (52)
for tag length L(S) = 101 and L(S) = 64, respectively. The
remaining parameters for each scenario are listed in Table I,
where L(M) is the message length, and L(K) is the key length.
For each scenario, we repeat the experiment 100 times. We
find that all the messages authenticated by Alice is accepted
by Bob in the simulations, i.e., the authentication error rate is
zero in the simulations. Fig. 15 shows the authentication rate
for each scenario. It can be seen that the proposed protocol
can achieve a high authentication rate.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a multi-message authentica-
tion framework, over Wiretap Channel, to achieve information-
theoretic security using the same key. The proposed framework
bridges the two research areas in PHY-layer security: secure
transmission and message authentication. Moreover, we have
developed a theorem revealing the requirements/conditions
for information-theoretic security, which provide guidance
and insights for authentication protocol design. We have
further devised a multi-message authentication protocol to
meet the security requirements, with high efficiency. The
theoretical analysis demonstrated that the proposed protocol
is information-theoretic secure for a polynomial number of
messages and attacks. Furthermore, the authentication rate
of the proposed protocol approaches infinity when n goes
to infinity. Finally, an efficient and feasible authentication
protocol over binary symmetric wiretap channel has been
proposed, and experiments results showed that this protocol
has a good performance. For the future work, we will extend
this study to develop a computationally efficient protocol for
Gaussian wiretap channels.
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